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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN J. BLOOMER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
KIM EDWARD, KIM EDWARD CONOVER 
and KAREN JANE CONOVER, a Utah 
General Partnership dba K & K 
SALES; and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Case No. 920400-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court 
and was within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992) . The 
case was transferred by the Supreme Court to this court, and 
jurisdiction is conferred on this court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does the evidence support the trial court's finding that 
defendant Kim Conover made false statements to plaintiff with 
intent to deceive? Appellate review is under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v, Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 
553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Is trial court's finding that plaintiff suffered a loss, 
and that the vehicle was defective and unsafe at the time she 
purchased it, supported by the evidence? Appellate review is under 
a "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
rescission of the transaction, even though the statute contemplates 
and the parties requested an award of damages? The judgment should 
be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion. See 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
4. In ordering rescission, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in failing to give defendants a specific credit for the 
use plaintiff had made of the vehicle? The judgment should be 
affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Dugan v. 
Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986). 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion is awarding 
Plaintiff her attorney fees without requiring allocation to each 
alleged theory plead in the complaint? The judgment should be 
affirmed unless Defendants have shown an abuse of discretion. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) 
6. Is Plaintiff entitled to recover her attorney fees on 
appeal. This is an original request addressed to the sound 
discretion of this Court. See Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 1992) and § 13-11-19 (1986) 
are reproduced in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is a civil action brought in 
the district court, seeking relief for damages relating to the sale 
of a used automobile. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed her action on November 3, 1989 (R. 2-11.) 
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 10, 1991. (R. 
110-21.) Defendants answered on April 29, 1991 (R. 122-23.), and 
amended their answer on July 1, 1991. (R. 134.) 
The case was tried to the court on September 3 and 4, 1991. 
(R. 136-38.) By direction of the trial court and stipulation of 
Defendants (R. 509-10), Plaintiff submitted evidence of her 
attorney fees by affidavit. (R. 140-72, 197-202.) 
On September 12, 1992, Defendants filed a "Motion for More 
Definite Statement Re Attorneys Fees and Order of Court to Require 
Plaintiff, Insofar as Possible to Restore Defendant to Status Quo." 
(R. 173-76.) Plaintiff responded to the motion. (R. 225-31.) 
On October 1, 1992, Plaintiff served a form of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 232-29) and a form of Judgment (R. 
240-42) on Defendants. Defendants objected to the proposals (R. 
203-07) and Plaintiff responded to the objections. (R. 219-22.) On 
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November 4, the trial court signed and entered the findings and 
judgment submitted by Plaintiff. (R. 232-29, 240-42.) 
On December 20, 1992, Defendants filed a second document (R. 
243-45) containing objections to Plaintiff's proposed findings and 
judgment, even though the findings and judgment had already been 
entered by the trial court.1 This second round of objections was 
argued orally to the trial court on December 31, 1991. The court 
modified some of its findings, and ordered that any appeal could 
run from the date of the modified findings and conclusions. (R. 
267.) An order formally vacating the findings and conclusions and 
judgment was entered March 4, 1992 (R. 316-18), after the Notice of 
Appeal had been filed. (R. 296-97.) 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 268-75) 
and an Amended Judgment (R. 276-79) were entered January 23, 1992.2 
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on February 19, 1992. (R. 
296-97.) Defendants have posted a bond to stay enforcement of the 
judgment pending this appeal. (R. 329-30.) 
*Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, requires 
that objections to proposed findings be submitted within five days 
after service. The proper method to object to a document which has 
already been entered is to serve a motion under either Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(b) or 59. Such motions must be served within 10 days of 
entry of judgment, and in this case should have been served no 
later than November 14, 1991. 
2A second version of the Amended Judgment, which contained 
blanks for the judgments for attorney fees and costs, was entered 
on March 4, 1992. (R. 312-15.) It is evident that this later 
document was entered in error, as the earlier document (R. 276-79) 
is in the same form but has the blanks filled in. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff purchased a 1986 Nissan Sentra automobile from Kim 
Conover on April 19, 1988. Mr. Conover, a licensed automobile 
dealer, together with his wife, operated a business known as K & K 
Sales, and had purchased the vehicle from Western Affiliated 
Salvage. (R. 407.) The business engaged in the purchase, repair, 
and sale of used automobiles, and Mr. Conover had regularly 
purchased automobiles from the salvage yard. (R. 408.) The vehicle 
sold to Plaintiff had been wrecked and declared a total loss by the 
insurance company. (R. 408.) 
Mr. Conover employed David Gray to perform some specific 
repairs to the vehicle, using used parts acquired by Mr. Conover. 
Mr. Gray recommended that the apron be replaced because it had been 
seriously damaged, and such frame parts lose their strength after 
being damaged that severely. (R. 490.) Mr. Conover instructed 
against making the necessary repair, and instead instructed Mr. 
Gray to simply square the apron as best he could. (R. 488.) Mr. 
Conover performed additional repairs himself on the vehicle's 
suspension. fid.) 
Consistent with his past practice (R. 409), Mr. Conover 
advertised the car for sale in the newspaper. The advertisement 
did not disclose that Mr. Conover was a dealer. (R. 383.) 
Plaintiff answered the advertisement in early April, 1988, and 
went, with her husband, to Mr. Conover's residence to look at the 
car. (R. 373.) Plaintiff asked Mr. Conover why he was selling the 
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car, and he answered that "they had several vehicles, and that his 
wife was pregnant and they needed another car." (R. 374.) Mr. 
Conover mentioned that he might be interested in purchasing 
Plaintiff's Ford Escort, stating that the reason for his interest 
was that "it would attach to the motor home and he could use it to 
tow it, use it for an extra vehicle." (R. 375.) He did not 
disclose that he was a car dealer nor that he was in the business 
of repairing wrecked automobiles and selling them. (R. 375.) 
Plaintiff looked around for about two weeks, and ultimately 
notified Mr. Conover that she wanted to buy the car. (R. 374-75.) 
On April 19, 1988, she gave him a check for $6,375.00, representing 
the difference between the value of the Escort and the asking price 
of the Nissan, and another check for $30.00 for the taxes on the 
Escort. (R. 375-76.) During the transaction, Mr. Conover stated 
that he was an RV dealer and could thus facilitate the transfer of 
title and related paper work. (R. 379.) He "never did mention 
that he was a [car] dealer, as such." fid.) 
Following the payment, Mr. Conover for the first time 
partially disclosed the prior damage to the car, but stated only 
that "the car had, at one point, the right front fender bent and he 
had replaced that and the right front headlight." (R. 377-78.) 
Mr. Conover did not disclose that the car had been totaled in a 
wreck. (R. 378.) 
About six months after the purchase, Plaintiff and her husband 
took the Nissan on a trip to Flagstaff, Arizona, for a family 
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wedding on October 22, 1988. Plaintiff's husband did some of the 
driving during the trip, and told Plaintiff the car badly need a 
wheel alignment. (R. 382.) Plaintiff also began to notice that as 
she "would go to either accelerate or decelerate, it would tug just 
slightly to one side . . . ." (Id.) 
Within a week of returning from Flagstaff, Plaintiff took the 
car to a tire store to have the wheels aligned. (R. 382.) It 
worked better for a day or two, but then the same problem returned, 
so she returned to the tire store and had the car realigned, fid.) 
The problem still wasn't fixed, so she took the car to another tire 
store, but with no greater success. She purchased and installed a 
total of six new tires in an effort to correct the problem and 
because of the abnormal wear on the tires. (R. 384.) Plaintiff 
paid $491.88 to the tire store for the repairs and tires. (R. 388, 
exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5.) 
During one the visits, the tire store determined that one of 
the ball joints had been installed incorrectly, and replaced it. 
(R. 466.) While replacing the ball joint, the mechanic discovered 
the frame was cracked. (R. 467.) Plaintiff then took her car to 
a Nissan dealer, who advised her the vehicle was unsafe to drive. 
(R. 386-87, exhibit P-7.) Plaintiff ultimately took the car to Les 
Jensen's Collision Repair. The mechanic, Ed Jensen, determined the 
vehicle had been subjected to a "fairly decent" side impact to the 
right front wheel (R. 475), and had been improperly repaired: 
Q [Mr. Martineau] Now, let me ask you 
this: Was the part or parts of this vehicle 
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that were damaged in the collision part of or 
units of the unibody construction? 
A [Ed Jensen] Critical units. 
Q What were they, which were they? 
A The right front side member—there 
are numerous pieces of a car that the manu-
facturer will build and sell to auto body 
facilities to replace. The right front frame 
member, there are things like baffles, rein-
forcements, isolated pieces that go on that, 
so you weld these together in a puzzle type 
situation. The front side member of the 
vehicle that holds the fender and actually 
holds to the cowl and welds to the frame, all 
of these pieces, in my opinion, should have 
been replaced. 
Q Were they? 
A They had never been replaced. 
Q They had not been replaced? 
A No. 
Q What had been done with them? 
A Well, they had been pulled, and I 
guess to some degree aligned to fit back in 
the rough configuration with the way the car 
should have been. There had been welds made. 
There had also been holes cut in some of the 
members that wouldn't have been there before. 
More or less, weakening the structure. 
(R. 477.) 
Mr. Jensen concluded the car was unsafe to drive (R. 484) and 
advised Plaintiff not to drive it. (R. 473.) Plaintiff commenced 
this action soon after to obtain appropriate relief for the 
defective and dangerous condition of the car. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
This appeal predominately challenges the trial court's factual 
findings, but Defendants' brief does not properly marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings. The evidence supports the 
findings that Kim Conover, a car dealer, purchased a wrecked 
automobile with the intent of repairing and reselling it, but that 
he sold it to Plaintiff under the pretence of being a private 
individual selling a family car. The evidence further shows that 
Mr. Conover took Plaintiff's car as a trade under the pretence that 
he would use it personally, although his real intent was to try to 
resell it to a university student. Mr. Conover failed to disclose 
that he was a dealer, and affirmatively tried to create the 
opposite impression, and failed to disclose that the car had been 
wrecked and improperly repaired. The evidence supports the finding 
of violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
The evidence further supports the finding that the damage to 
Plaintiff's car existed from the time she purchased it from 
Defendants. Plaintiff suffered a loss. 
Although not requested by the parties, the restitution order 
made by the trial court was fair and was within the court's 
discretion. The court was not required, under the facts of this 
case, to use mathematical precision in returning the parties to the 
status quo. 
The trial court properly awarded Plaintiff her attorney fees 
because Plaintiff was the prevailing party. The fact that 
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Plaintiff did not prevail on each alternative theory she had 
pleaded is irrelevant. 
Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below, and is entitled to 
an award of fees on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURTS FINDINGS OF A VIOLATION OF TWO 
SECTIONS OF THE DECEPTIVE PRACTICES ACT ARE 
AMPLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL. 
Defendants claim the evidence did not support the trial 
court's finding that Kim Conover made false statements to Plaintiff 
with intent to deceive. The proper procedure for presenting such 
a claim, and the standard of appellate review, are set forth in 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989): 
In order to challenge a trial court's findings 
of fact, a party "must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Id. at 553 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
Defendants have not marshalled the evidence in support of the 
findings. The Mountain States court continued: "Appellants often 
overlook or disregard this heavy burden. When the duty to marshall 
is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Id. 
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(citations omitted). Besides failing to marshall the evidence, 
Defendants have also failed to present a "statement of the issues 
presented for review and the standard of appellate review for each 
issue with supporting authority for each issue." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5) (emphasis added). Because Defendants have not complied 
with these rules, this Court should decline to consider Defendants' 
arguments. Utah R. App. P. 24(k); Mountain States, supra, 783 P.2d 
at 553. 
While is it not appellee's burden to marshall and discuss the 
evidence, a review of the court's findings and the supporting 
evidence demonstrates that the court's decision was not clearly 
erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52, and is fully 
supported by the evidence. 
Defendants first challenge the finding that Defendants 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4(c) (Supp. 1992), which states 
that a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the 
supplier, with intent to deceive, "indicates that the subject of a 
consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has been 
used to an extent that is materially different from the fact." 
(emphasis supplied). The court stated from the bench: 
I am finding there is a violation of Section 
13-11-4(c) making it unlawful for a sellar 
[sic] or supplier to indicate that the subject 
of the consumer transaction is new, or unused, 
if it is not, or has been used to an extent 
that is materially different from the fact. 
I think the fact that the car was totally 
demolished almost, or was at least totalled 
out by the insurance company, is a material 
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fact that was different from the way that it 
had be [sic] represented to the plaintiff, and 
I think that that section was violated. 
(R. 588.) The Court further clarified its ruling in written form 
in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
January 23, 1992. A somewhat lengthy citation to those written 
findings makes the trial court's decision regarding § 13-11-4(c) 
(Supp. 1992) clear. 
9. . . . K & K Sales became fully aware, 
and was charged with full notice, of the fact 
that the subject vehicle had been severely 
damaged in an automobile accident to such an 
extent that the subject vehicle had been 
affiliated as a salvage vehicle. 
10. Subsequent to October 12, 1987, K & 
K Sales made or caused to be made, certain 
repairs to the subject vehicle. 
11. On or about April 19, 1988, K & K 
Sales, acting through Conover as its duly 
authorized agent, sold and conveyed the sub-
ject vehicle to plaintiff and in connection 
therewith, K & K Sales and Conover, with 
intent to deceive plaintiff, represented to 
plaintiff that the subject vehicle was a low 
mileage vehicle, that it had been repaired 
following an accident in which it had been 
involved, whereby it had only sustained damage 
to one of its front fenders, that the subject 
vehicle was in good condition and state of 
repair, that it could be operated safely, and 
that it was reasonable fit and fully operable 
for its intended use. 
12. At the time K & K Sales and Conover 
sold the subject vehicle to plaintiff, K & K 
Sales and Conover knew and were charged with 
full knowledge (a) that the subject vehicle 
had sustained severe structural damage in the 
aforementioned accident, (b) that unless such 
damage had been properly and professionally 
repaired, the subject vehicle could not be 
operated safely and without the same consti-
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tuting a severe hazard to its operator and the 
public at large, and (c) that the value of the 
subject vehicle, if not properly so repaired, 
would be but a fraction of the value of the 
subject vehicle had the aforementioned repre-
sentations been true, 
13. Plaintiff, in reasonably [sic] and 
foreseeable reliance upon the aforementioned 
representations and without knowledge of their 
falsity, purchased the subject vehicle. 
14. Subsequent to plaintiff's purchase 
of the subject vehicle, plaintiff learned and 
became aware of the fact that K & K Sales and 
Conover had made or caused to be made certain 
repairs to the subject vehicle. 
15. The aforementioned acts and breaches 
of duty on the part of K & K Sales and Conover 
constituted deceptive and unconscionable acts 
and practices under 5 13-11-4 and 13-11-5 of 
the Sales Practices Act. 
R. 306-08. 
Each of these findings is supported by the evidence. 
Defendants do not challenge any finding specifically, but instead 
level a general charge that there was no evidence that Kim Conover 
misrepresented the condition of the automobile, nor that he had an 
intent to deceive. 
Mr. Conover's testimony indicates that he was aware that the 
subject vehicle had been totalled. "Q. Did you understand it had 
been totalled by the insurance company?" A. "Yes, I understood 
the insurance company paid off a claim against this particular 
vehicle." (R. 408.) Marilyn Bloomer testified that at no time 
before the sale was there any mention of the fact that the car had 
been in any type of an accident, but that after the transaction had 
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been finished and as she was leaving, Mr. Conover indicated that 
the right front fender had been bent and replaced and the headlight 
had also been replaced. No indication was made that the car had 
been totalled, that it had had any major repair work done or any 
other indication of its diminished value. (R. 377-78.) This 
testimony regarding Mr. Conover's failure to mention in any way 
before the sale the extensive damage and repairs made to the 
vehicle, coupled with his later misrepresentation as to the extent 
of that damage, is more than sufficient to uphold the trial court,s 
ruling that Mr. Conover made misrepresentations as to the value of 
the vehicle and represented it had been "used to an extent that is 
materially different from the fact."3 
Further evidence on the question of disclosure also supports 
the trial court's finding of non-disclosure. Mr. Conover testified 
that he had never met Joseph Bloomer, Marilyn Bloomer's husband. 
Q Who was in the car when she took the 
test drive? 
A We had Ann Prosence with us, I 
believe. Yeah. 
Q Ann Prosence. And who drove it? 
A Marilyn drove the car. 
Q And which seat were you in? 
A I think I was setting in the back 
seat, but I can't recall, it has been over 
three years ago. 
Q Could it have been her husband in 
the front seat? 
A No. Never met her husband. 
Q Was the condition with [sic] the 
Nissan discussed by you? 
3
 This is particularly true in light of Rule 52 (a) 's 
requirement that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
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A Yes, it was. 
(R. 414.) Yet, this testimony is directly contradicted by that of 
Joseph Bloomer where he indicated: 
Q Are you acquainted with Kim Conover? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you relate the circumstances 
under which you became acquainted with Mr. 
Conover? 
A When my wife and I went to look at cars, 
we went to his home. I drove the little 
Escort we had up to the home, and we was 
looking for the address. And when we got 
there, Marilyn went to the door, and he 
came out, and we looked at the car. And 
so he wanted to know if we wanted to take 
a ride in it, and Marilyn got in the 
driver's side, I got in the right hand 
front seat, and Mr. Conover got in the 
back seat. 
Q So you rode in the Nissan on that 
occasion? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Was this before or on the date that 
Marilyn bought the vehicle? 
A Before. 
Q How long before? 
A Couple days, probably. 
Q Would it have been a couple of 
weeks? 
A It might have. I'm not real posi-
tive on that exactly when she got the car. 
Q Do you remember having been a party 
to any discussion with Mr. Conover on that 
occasion? 
A Other than it was a family car. 
They wanted to get rid of it. He said his 
wife was pregnant and they needed something 
larger. 
Q Was anything said about the vehicle 
having been damaged? 
A No. 
Q Was anything said about the price? 
A Not then. No. 
Q Not at that time? 
A No. 
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(R. 498.) He then further testified that he would have wanted to 
look inside and out of the car if he had been told it had been hit. 
(R. 499.) It is apparent that the trial court chose to credit 
Marilyn and Joseph Bloomer's testimony over that of Kim Conover. 
Such a decision was an appropriate use of the trial court's 
discretion as the ultimate factfinder, and gives no cause on appeal 
for a reversal or modification. 
Defendants' next assertion on appeal is that defendant made no 
statement with the "intent to deceive," and that "the evidence was 
that he had every right to believe the subject vehicle was in safe 
condition." Brief of Appellant at 7. This claim is untenable. 
Extensive and consistent testimony at trial indicated that the 
repairs were done in slip shod fashion and that Kim Conover knew 
that additional repairs were needed. David Grey, the mechanic who 
did the original repairs on the vehicle, stated that he did only 
$930.00 worth of repairs. (R. 489.) The repairs were specifically 
dictated by Mr. Conover, rather than by what the vehicle needed. 
(R. 486-87, 489.) For example, Mr. Gray believed that the apron 
panel should be replaced, and so informed Mr. Conover. (R. 488-
89.) Mr. Conover was apparently unable to locate a used apron 
panel, and requested that Mr. Gray "just go ahead and square it up, 
you know, the best as possible." (R. 488.) 
Mr. Gray further testified that if the vehicle had been 
intended for his own personal use, he would have "replaced a lot 
more parts." He explained that the frame parts, such as the apron 
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panel, "lose their strength after they have been damaged that 
severe." (R. 490. See also R. 493.) 
Ed Jensen, a man who has spent his entire life in the autobody 
industry, testified even more forcefully as to the poor quality of 
the repairs. He first testified that he would consider the repairs 
to be "marginal." (R. 472.) He further testified that "it was 
obvious that something was wrong, had been repaired improperly. 
And if she was having that much trouble as they had described to 
me, I suggested they didn't drive it any further . . . ." Id. He 
then testified that "I moved the wheel back and forth, which 
indicated there were major problems, either something lost or one 
thing or another." And that if there had been nothing wrong the 
wheel would not have moved freely in that fashion.4 (R. 474.) He 
then testified "And then, of course, we noted that there were 
improper repairs done to the car. Repairs that were very obviously 
not — oh, wouldn't be kosher with manufacturing processing of 
returning the car to its pre-collision condition." (R. 475.) 
Then, discussing trial exhibit P-6, he expressed his opinion that 
that list of repairs should have been made to make the car safe. 
(R. 478.) He finished his testimony by stating that "there were no 
signs of damage to the vehicle other than that what had been 
repaired" (R. 482), thereby rebutting the defense inference that 
the damage had occurred after the sale. Examining this extensive 
4
 Mervin Brown, a front-end mechanic for Big-0 Tire in 
Centerville, testified that a ball joint had been installed 
incorrectly. (R. 466.) 
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testimony in light of the fact that appellant did much of the work 
himself, and the fact that a safety inspection does not check for 
these kinds of latent defects, it is clear the trial court had 
ample evidence in the record to support its decision. 
Defendants also challenges the finding that Defendants 
violated Section 13-11-4 (d) , which states that ,fa supplier commits 
a deceptive act or practice, if the supplier, with intent to 
deceive: 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is available to the consumer for a 
reason that does not exist[.] 
Defendants' sparse argument (slightly less than a full page) 
makes no serious attempt to marshall the evidence and merely 
asserts that Mrs. Bloomer was aware that appellant was a dealer. 
Appellants' Brief at 8-9. Appellant fails to address both the 
court's actual ruling and the underlying rationale supporting that 
ruling. The court's oral ruling indicates that the court found a 
violation of Section 13-11-4(d) because Mr. Conover represented he 
wished to sell the car because of a family decision, when in fact 
he was selling it as a dealer. The more specific language is thus: 
Also Section D, making it unlawful for the 
supplier to indicate that the subject of the 
consumer transaction is available to the 
consumer for a reason that does not exist, I 
believe the evidence in this case, as I say, 
it would indicate that Mr. Conover indicated 
that the reason that he wanted to sell it was 
because it was a family car. His wife was 
pregnant. He needed to get rid of it. For 
that reasons, all those things were technical-
ly true. The fact he is a dealer in automo-
biles, was in the business of repairing them 
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and selling them, that was not disclosed to 
plaintiff, I think that is a violation of 
section D. 
(R. 588. See also R. 597.) Careful reading of this language 
indicates that while the facts Mr. Conover stated were "technically 
true," the court felt that the actual reason for which Mr. Conover 
was letting the car out for sale was that he was a dealer in those 
automobiles and was simply seeking to make a profit. 
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Mr. Conover never told 
Marilyn Bloomer that he was a dealer in used automobiles, only that 
he dealt in recreational vehicles. 
Q Up to this time, were you aware that 
he was a licensed motor vehicle dealer? 
A No. 
(R. 375.) She later testified 
. . . and at the point that I went to give him the 
check for $6,375.00, he let me know that he was an RV 
dealer, never did mention that he was a dealer, as such. 
Q What did he say about being an RV 
dealer? 
A He said that because he was an RV 
dealer, he could process it more cheaply and 
that would save me on the taxes or license 
fees. 
(R. 379 (emphasis supplied).) A reading of the entire context of 
Mrs. Bloomer's comments provides more than adequate support for the 
explicit finding that Kim Conover failed to disclose he was in the 
business of repairing and selling automobiles. 
Mr. Conover failed to disclose his intention to sell the Ford 
Escort which he accepted as part of the purchase price, and instead 
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told Plaintiff a story that he intended to use it for personal use. 
Marilyn Bloomer testified that she was given trade in value for the 
Escort because appellant indicated to her that it would attach to 
the back of his motorhome and he could use it as an extra vehicle, 
(R. 375.) Yet Mr. Conover testified that he wanted the Escort 
because university students would be prone to buy it. (R. 412.) 
Mr. Conover also testified that his intent to sell the Nissan 
existed from the time he acquired it, which was contrary to his 
statement to Plaintiff that he formed that intent later: 
Q After you acquired this vehicle, did you 
put it up for sale? 
A No. I had to get this vehicle repaired 
before I could sell it. It had been 
damaged on the right side of the vehicle. 
Q But upon completion of those repairs, you 
did put it for sale; did you not? 
A Yeah. A couple of months afterwards, I 
had been driving — my wife had been 
using it for errands around town. 
He then further indicated that he advertised vehicles in the paper 
30-40% of the time. 
Q Is there a practice that you had followed 
in your business in selling vehicles? 
A Yeah. Probably, oh 30, 40% of them. A 
lot of time I have them pre-sold. This 
particular vehicle, yes, I had advertised 
it in the paper. 
Q It wasn't uncommon at this time for you 
to discuss in the paper and sell them by 
that means; isn't that true? 
A No. It is not uncommon. 
Q What telephone number did you use in the 
advertisement? 
A I used my home telephone number, 943-
1114, area code 801. 
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A careful reading of this testimony, coupled with the trial 
court's discretion in crediting testimony, leaves one with the 
definite impression and fair inference that Mr. Conover sold this 
vehicle in the same manner as he sold other vehicles out of his 
office. His wife may have used the vehicle, but it is common for 
dealers to make personal use of vehicles in their possession while 
they are waiting to be sold. Therefore, the trial court's 
decision, that Mr. Conover was selling the vehicle as part of his 
used car business, is supported by the evidence and not subject to 
reversal. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED A LOSS BY REASON OF 
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
THE DEFECTIVE AND UNSAFE NATURE OF 
THE VEHICLE. 
Defendants claim that plaintiff is precluded from recovering 
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, because she did not 
suffer a loss. In support of their claim, defendants cite only the 
evidence supporting defendants and contend that the vehicle had 
passed two safety inspections, and that the damage could have been 
caused by a "curb, gutter, chuckhole, any number of things." 
(Defendants' Brief at p. 11.) Defendants fail to acknowledge the 
compelling contrary evidence, which amply supports the finding of 
loss. 
Defendants rely principally upon the testimony that the damage 
could have been caused by hitting a curb, chuckhole, etc. An 
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initial failing of this claim is that Marilyn Bloomer testified 
that she never hit any curb, chuckhole, or other similar obstruc-
tion. (R. 551.) A second infirmity with the argument is that the 
problems became apparent only a few months after purchase. Mrs. 
Bloomer testified that about six months after purchasing the 
vehicle, it began to tug slightly to one side. Her husband drove 
it briefly at this time and told her that it badly needed a wheel 
alignment. (R. 381-82.) Finally, Ed Jensen, an auto body expert, 
testified that there was no evidence that the vehicle had ever 
struck a curb or other obstruction with sufficient force to do any 
damage, and further testified that there were no signs of any 
damage to the vehicle other than the initial frame repairs 
performed at the request of Kim Conover. (R. 481-82.) This 
testimony was corroborated by David Gray, who was responsible for 
performing the initial repairs. He testified that hitting a curb 
or chuckhole would likely have caused additional damage to the 
frame because the frame had lost its strength in the initial 
collision and had not been properly repaired. (R. 490.) 
Defendants also claim that the fact the vehicle passed two 
safety inspections shows that it was safe when Mrs. Bloomer 
purchased it and that the problems did not arise until after the 
second inspection. Defendants did not present any evidence, 
however, concerning the competency of the persons who performed the 
inspections. (R. 521.) The testimony to the effect that the 
vehicle would not have passed an inspection in the damaged 
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condition was contingent upon the inspection being performed 
properly by a competent inspector. (R. 528-29, 534-35, 544.) 
The trial court specifically found that the structural damage 
to the vehicle was caused prior to the time Mrs. Bloomer purchased 
it, and that the damage existed at the time of her purchase. (R. 
306-08.) This finding is supported by the evidence and must 
therefore be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN CRAFTING A FAIR 
AND EQUITABLE DECREE. 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint sought an award of 
damages, or "such other and further relief as may appear just and 
equitable in the premises." (R. 120.) The trial court declined to 
enter an award of damages, but instead held that the suit was in 
the nature of fraud and that the appropriate remedy was rescission. 
Defendants do not challenge that rescission is an appropriate 
remedy for fraud, but claim instead that rescission is not a 
permissible remedy under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and 
further, that the decree of rescission did not give proper credit 
for the use plaintiff had made of the vehicle. Both claims should 
be rejected by this court. 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act does, as argued by 
defendants, provide that a consumer who suffers damage from a 
violation of the Act may be awarded damages. Utah Code Ann. § 13-
11-19(2) (1986). The Act also provides, however, that M[t]he 
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remedies of this Act are in addition to remedies otherwise 
available for the same conduct under state or local law . . . .M 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-23 (1986). Rescission is an appropriate 
remedy for fraud under Utah law. Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 
1247 (Utah 1980) ("Dugan I"). Although rescission was not the 
primary relief plaintiff requested, plaintiff had requested that 
the court order such other relief as was appropriate. The court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that rescission was the 
appropriate remedy in this case. 
Defendants also claim that the decree of rescission improperly 
failed to return the parties to the status quo ante. Specifically, 
defendants claim that they were entitled to an offset for the use 
plaintiff made of the vehicle. 
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the general proposition that 
" [t]o rescind a partially executed contract, the party seeking 
rescission usually must be able to place the other party in the 
same position that existed before the execution of the contract." 
50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City. 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also observed, however, as follows: 
The rule that the rescinding party must re-
store the opposing party to the status quo 
is not a technical rule, but rather 
it is equitable, and requires prac-
ticality in adjusting the rights of 
the parties. How this is to be 
accomplished, or indeed whether it 
can, is a matter which is within the 
discretion of the trial court under 
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the facts as found to exist by the 
trier of fact. 
Duaan v. Jones, 724 P. 2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) ("Dugan II") (quoting 
Smith v. Huber. 666 P.2d 1122 (Colo. App. 1983)). 
In Duaan II, the buyers claimed fraud in the sale of real 
property and stopped making payments. The sellers sued to 
foreclose the note and mortgage executed by the buyers, and the 
buyers counterclaimed for fraud. The buyers ultimately abandoned 
the premises, and the sellers retook possession. The trial court 
awarded the buyers judgment for the payments they had made on the 
contract, but did not award any interest. The court denied the 
sellers7 request for an offset for the reasonable rental value of 
the property while the buyers were in possession. The sellers 
appealed asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred 
in failing to award sellers the reasonable rental value of the 
property. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
While assigning error to the trial 
court's failure to award them rent, plaintiffs 
fail to acknowledge that the court also disal-
lowed defendants interest on payments made on 
the purchase price for the period before 
rescission on the expressly stated ground that 
defendants had the use and possession of the 
property, although plaintiffs had the use of 
defendants' money. That finding itself im-
plies that the trial court did in fact compen-
sate plaintiffs for the loss of use and pos-
session of their property. Since it was 
difficult to arrive at a fair rental value, 
given the limited use value of the store and 
the sparsely populated area where the store 
was located, that financial adjustment seems 
eminently fair and equitable. 
Dugan II, 724 P.2d at 957. 
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Of similar effect is the case of Forsythe v. Elkins, 216 Mont. 
108, 700 P.2d 596 (1985). This case was cited approvingly by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Dugan II. 724 P.2d at 957, as an example of 
an exception to the general rule that the parties be restored to 
the status quo. The plaintiffs in that action entered into an oral 
agreement to jointly purchase property with the defendants. Part 
of the agreement was that each would be able to occupy trailer 
residences on the property. The defendants later breached the 
agreement, and the plaintiffs sued for rescission. The trial court 
rejected the rescission claim because the plaintiffs had not 
tendered their return of their interest in the property and had 
remained in occupancy of the property, but held that plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover the principal portion of payments they had 
made towards the property, subject to an offset to defendants for 
the reasonable rental value of the plaintiffs' occupancy of the 
property. 
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and held the plaintiffs 
were entitled to rescission. The court held that although 
restoration to the status quo was generally required, "absolute and 
literal restoration is not required, it being sufficient if 
restoration is such as is reasonably possible or as may be demanded 
by the equities of the case." 700 P.2d at 601. The court held 
that under the equities of that case, the defendants should refund 
all payments, both the principal and interest portions, made by the 
plaintiffs, together with interest on those payments from the time 
26 
of rescission, and further held that the defendants were not 
entitled to any credit for the plaintiffs7 occupancy of the 
premises up to the time of rescission. Id. 
The trial courts decision in the instant case was likewise 
fair under the particular equities of this case. The trial court 
awarded plaintiff judgment against defendants for all payments 
plaintiff had made for the purchase of the automobile and ordered 
plaintiff to return the automobile to defendants in its present 
condition. Although the court did not make any adjustment for the 
use plaintiff had made of the automobile, the court likewise did 
not require defendants to compensate plaintiff for the many dollars 
she spent in attempting to repair the vehicle and for the six new 
tires she put on the vehicle. Plaintiff testified that problems 
with the vehicle started about six months after she purchased it, 
and continued for the remainder of the time she had the vehicle. 
It was well within the trial court's discretion to conclude that 
any benefit plaintiff received from use of the defective and 
troublesome vehicle was offset by the money she paid in attempting 
to have the vehicle repaired. It cannot be said that the trial 
court abused its discretion under the equities of this case. 
POINT IV 
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS WITHIN 
THE COURT'S DISCRETION. 
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth several alternative theories 
under which plaintiff was entitled to relief and sought an award of 
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damages under each claim. The trial court rejected some of the 
theories but awarded damages for the violation of the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act. Defendants now make the novel argument that 
because some of the alternative theories were not successful, 
plaintiff was required to allocate her attorney fees to each 
individual claim for relief. 
Defendants have set forth no law nor meaningful argument in 
support of their claim. The Utah appellate courts have consistent-
ly held that an appellate court will not reach the merits of a 
claim which is not supported by adequate legal analysis and case 
citations. The courts have declined to rule on issues where the 
party's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support 
[the] argument," stating that "Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court requires that the argument section of a brief 
'contain the contentions of the [party] with respect to the issues 
presented and the reasons therefor, with citations . . . . A brief 
must contain some support for each contention." State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)5 (quoting State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
See also State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(where defendant provided no analysis, citation to the record, or 
citation to case authority, the court would not reach substantive 
claim). As in Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. 
5Wareham relies on a previous version of Rule 24(a)(9) which 
is substantially the same as the current version of the Rule.) 
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App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), this Court should not 
"consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the 
record or cases involving pivotal issues." 
If the court does decide to address the merits of defendants' 
claim, the claim should nonetheless be rejected. Utah Code Ann. § 
13-11-19 authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party if "an action under this section has been 
terminated by a judgment or required by the court to be settled 
under Section 13-11-21(1)(a) [relating to class actions]." 
Plaintiff brought an action under § 13-11-19 and prevailed in that 
action, and the action was terminated by a judgment. Plaintiff is 
accordingly entitled to her reasonable attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in pursuing the action. 
Plaintiff's counsel would have been derelict in his represen-
tation of plaintiff if he had not alleged all possible theories 
under which plaintiff could recover. Pursuing each of those 
theories was part of the "work reasonably performed" in pursuit of 
the action under the Consumer Sales Practices Act. Defendants have 
failed to show where the trial court abused its discretion in 
making the award. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-11-19(5) (1986). Where attorney fees were awarded 
29 
below, they should similarly be awarded on appeal. Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). 
The burden is on defendants to show a reason to depart from this 
general rule. Watson v. Watson, Case No. 910223-CA, 1992 WL 207682 
(Utah Ct. App. Aug 24, 1992) . Defendants have not shown any reason 
for departing from this general rule, and plaintiff is not aware of 
any. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence amply supports the trial court's findings. The 
equitable award crafted by the trial court was fair under the 
circumstances of this case and within the court7s discretion. The 
Judgment and Decree should be affirmed in all respects, and 
plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this /v'~t*~ day of September, 1992. 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
RAY G. MARTINEAU (#2105) 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN J. BLOOMER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
KIM EDWARD CONOVER; KIM 
EDWARD CONOVER and KAREN JANE 
CONOVER, a Utah General 
Partnership dba K & K SALES; ] 
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
a Corporation; and DAVID GRAY, ] 
dba METAL CRAFT AUTO REPAIR, ] 
Defendants. 
i AMENDED 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890906666 CV 
(Judge Scott Daniels) 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial 
before the court sitting without a jury on September 3, 1991 at 
9:00 o'clock a.m. the plaintiff appearing in person and by and 
through her attorney Ray G. Martineau, the defendant Kim Edward 
Conover appearing in person and said defendant and the defen-
dants Karen Jane Conovjr, K & K Sales and Western Surety 
Company appearing by and through their attorney James L. Barker 
Jr. and the defendant David Gray appearing in person pro se, 
and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and 
- 1 -
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having considered a number of written exhibits that were intro-
duced into evidence and the Court having received the Affidavit 
and Supplemental Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney regarding 
his attorney's fees and costs expended on behalf of plaintiff, 
and the defendants having filed their Motion For More Definite 
Statement Re Attorneys Fees And Order Of Court To Require 
Plaintiff, Insofar As Possible To Restore Defendant To Status 
Quo, and plaintiff having filed her response thereto and the 
defendant Kim Edward Conover having filed Defendant Kim Edward 
Conover's Objection To Plaintiff's Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law And Judgment And Reply To Plaintiff's 
Response To Defendant's Motion Re Attorney's Fees And Returning 
Parties To Status Quo and the Court having heretofore made and 
entered its Order Vacating Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of 
Law And Judgment herein and the Court having heard and con-
sidered the arguments, statements and stipulations of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor hereby makes and enters the following 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is now and at all material times herein 
has been a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Kim Edward Conover ("Conover") is now 
and at all material times herein has been a "supplier" under 
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,1M9SC; 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act") 
and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant K & K Sales ("K & K Sales") is a Utah 
General Partnership, consisting of Kim Edward Conover and Karen 
Jane Conover as its general partners, that was at all material 
times herein a duly licensed Motor Vehicle Dealer under and 
pursuant to the Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act"), 
Title 41, Utah Code Ann., and a "supplier" under the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act"), Title 13, 
Chapter 11, Utah Code Ann. (1987), whose principal office and 
place of business in now and at all material times herein has 
been located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Western Surety Company ("Western") is a 
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the 
laws of the State of South Dakota who at all material times 
herein has been duly authorized to transact, and who has in 
fact at all material times herein transacted, business as a 
surety company in the State of Utah. 
5. Defendant David Gray ("Gray") is now and at all 
material times herein has been a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah who at all material times herein transacted busi-
ness under the assumed*, fictitious and unregistered name of 
Metaicraft Auto Repair. 
6. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of and par-
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ties to this action is properly vested and exists in this Court 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 3, Utah Code 
Ann. (1986). 
7. Venue of this action properly rests in this Court 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 13, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). 
8. As a material and essential requirement for the 
issuance and continued validity of the license of K & K Sales 
to act as a Motor Vehicle Dealer under and pursuant to the 
Motor Vehicle Act, K & K Sales was required, pursuant to the 
provision of Section 41-3-16 of the Motor Vehicle Act, to post 
a certain Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealer (Bond No, 58270937) 
issued by Western in the penal sum of $20,000.00, which bond 
was in full force and effect at all material times herein. 
9. On or about October 12, 1987 K & K Sales acquired 
that certain 1986 Nissan Stanza motor vehicle, VIN 
JN8HM05Y5GX005738 ("Subject Vehicle"), from Western Affiliated 
Salvage ("Affiliated") and in connection therewith Affiliated 
advised K & K Sales, and K & K Sales became fully aware, and 
was charged with full notice, of the fact that the Subject 
Vehicle had been severely damaged in an automobile accident to 
such an extent that tile Subject Vehicle had been acquired by 
Affiliated as a salvage vehicle. 
10. Subsequent to October 12, 1987 K & K Sales made 
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or caused to be made certain repairs to the Subject Vehicle. 
11. On or about April 19, 1988 K & K Sales, acting 
through Conover as its duly authorized agent, sold and conveyed 
the Subject Vehicle to plaintiff and in connection therewith K 
& K Sales and Conover, with intent to deceive plaintiff, repre-
sented to plaintiff that the Subject Vehicle was a low mileage 
vehicle, that it had been repaired following an accident in 
which it had been involved whereby it had only sustained damage 
to one of its front fenders, that the Subject Vehicle was in 
good condition and state of repair, that it could be operated 
safely and that it was reasonably .fit and fully operable for 
its intended use, 
12. At the time K & K Sales and Conover sold the 
Sxibject Vehicle to plaintiff, K & K Sales and Conover knew and 
were charged with full knowledge (a) that the Subject Vehicle 
had sustained severe structural damage in the aforementioned 
accident, (b) that unless such damage had been properly and 
professionally repaired the Subject Vehicle could not be 
operated safely and without the same constituting a severe 
hazard to its operator and the public at large, and (c) that 
the value of the Subject Vehicle, if not properly so repaired, 
would be but a fraction of the value the Subject Vehicle had 
the aforementioned representations been true. 
13. Plaintiff, in reasonably and foreseeable reliance 
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upon the aforementioned representations and without knowledge 
of their falsity, purchased the Subject Vehicle. 
14. Subsequent to plaintiff*s purchase of the Subject 
Vehicle, plaintiff learned and became aware of the fact that 
K & K Sales and Conover had made or caused to be made certain 
repairs to the Subject Vehicle. 
15. The aforementioned acts and breaches of duty on 
the part of K & K Sales and Conover constituted deceptive and 
unconscionable acts and practices under Section 13-11-4 and 
13-11-5 of the Sales Practices Act. 
16. As a proximate and foreseeable consequence of the 
aforementioned acts and breaches of duty on the part of K & K 
Sales and Conover, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to 
suffer recoverable actual damages in the amount of $7,175.00 
which plaintiff is entitled to recover ~rom K & K Sales and 
Conover, and each of them, in this proceeding, together with 
plaintiff's costs in the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney1s fees 
in the amount of $ 9,500.00, which plaintiff is entitled to 
recover from K & K Sales and Conover, and each of them, in this 
proceeding. 
17. Western |s liable to plaintiff under and pursuant 
to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Sales Practices 
Act and the aforementioned Bond for any and ail sums for which 
plaintiff is awarded judgment herein against K & K Sales and 
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Conover, or any of them, including costs and attorney1s fees. 
18. The defendants Kim Edward Conover and K & K Sales 
did not violate the Federal Act. 
19. The defendant David Gray did not violate the pro-
visions of the Federal Act, the Motor Vehicle Act or the Sales 
Practices Act. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jurisdiction over the parties to and subject 
matter of these proceedings is properly vested in this Court 
and the venue of this action properly rests in this Court. 
2. In connection with the sale of the Subject 
Vehicle to plaintiff, defendants Kim Edward Conover and K & K 
Sales, violated the provisions of the Sales Practices Act with 
the "intent to deceive" plaintiff. 
3. The most appropriate remedy in these proceedings 
is in the equitable nature of rescission whereby plaintiff 
should be awarded judgment against the defendants, and each of 
them, for the sum of $7,175,00 together with plaintiff costs in 
1 
the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of 
$ 9,500.00, and whereby the plaintiff should be ordered to 
deliver the Subject Vehicle in its present condition, together 
with the title thereto to K & K Sales upon the payment and 
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satisfaction of the sums that are due to her as hereinabove 
stated. 
4. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive 
damages as against the defendants. 
5. Defendant David Gray is entitled to a dismissal 
with prejudice of all claims that have been asserted against 
him in this proceeding. 
DATED this day of January, 1992, 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law was served 
upon the following named individuals by hand delivering a copy 
thereof, at the address shown below this 3) \ day of 
December, 1991: 
James L. Barker, Jr. 
2 452 Emearson Avenue 
Salt Lai& City, Utah 84108 
APPENDIX "B" 
Amended Judgment 
RAY G. MARTINEAU (#2105) 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN J. BLOOMER.-
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIM EDWARD CONOVER; KIM 
EDWARD CONOVER and KAREN JANE 
CONOVER, a Utah General 
Partnership dba K & K SALES; 
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
a Corporation; and DAVID GRAY, 
dba METAL CRAFT AUTO REPAIR, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
I '-a \ U W ^ 
Civil No. 890906666 CV 
(Judge Scott Daniels) 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial 
before the court sitting without a jury on September 3, 1991 at 
9:00 o'clock a.m. the plaintiff appearing in person and by and 
through her attorney Ray G. Martineau, the defendant Kim Edward 
Conover appearing in person and said defendant and the defen-
dants Karen Jane Conover, K & K Sales and Western Surety 
Company appearing by and through their attorney James L. Barker 
Jr. and the defendant David Gray appearing in person pro se, 
and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and 
'JAN 2 3 »92 
having considered a number of written exhibits that were intro-
duced into evidence and the Court having received the Affidavit 
and Supplemental Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney regarding 
his attorney's fees and costs rendered and incurred on behalf 
of plaintiff, and the defendants having filed their Motion For 
More Definite Statement Re Attorneys Fees And Order Of Court To 
Require Plaintiff, Insofar As Possible To Restore Defendant To 
Status Quo and Defendant Kim Edward Conovers Objection To 
Plaintiff's Findings Of Act And Conclusions Of Law And 
Judgment, and Reply to Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's 
Motion Re Attorney's Fees And Returning Parties To Status Quo 
and the Court having heretofore made and entered its Order 
Vacating Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and Judgment 
herein, and the Court having heard and considered the argu-
ments, statements and stipulations of counsel and being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor and 
the Court having heretofore entered its Amended Findings of. 
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain-
tiff be and she is hereby granted judgment against the defen-
dants Kim Edward Conover, Kim Edward Conover and Karen Jane 
Conover a Utah General Partnership dba K & K Sales, and Western 
Surety Company, and each of them, for the sum of $7,175.00 
together with costs in the amount of $ 450.00 and attorney's 
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fees in the amount of $ 9,-500.00. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDER,. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
upon the payment and satisfaction in full of the sums due 
plaintiff as above provided, plaintiff shall deliver the motor 
vehicle that is the subject of these proceedings in its present 
condition together with the title thereto to the defendant K & 
K Sales. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that all claims asserted against the defendant David Gray in 
the above entitled proceedings may be and the same are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE 
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT 
BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY 
AFFIDAVIT." 
DATED this 7 ^ day of January, 1992. 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Judgment was served upon the following named 
individual by hand delivering a copy thereof, at the address 
shown below this O 1 day of December, 1991: 
James L. Barker, Jr. 
2452 Emerson Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
H 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 1992) 
13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier m connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a de-
ceptive act or practice if the supplier, with intent to deceive. 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsor-
ship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, 
if it has not, 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particu-
lar standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not, 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or un-
used, if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different 
from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to 
the consumer for a reason that does not exist, 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been sup-
plied m accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(£) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied 
in greater quantity than the supplier intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not; 
d) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation 
he does not have, 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a 
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other 
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other 
benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in 
return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers or 
otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, 
if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the 
consumer enters into the transaction, 
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods 
or furnish the services within the time advertised or otherwise repre-
sented or. if no specific time is advertised or represented, fails to ship the 
goods or furnish the services withm 30 days, unless within the applicable 
time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either 
cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments 
to the supplier or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed 
by the supplier, but any refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer 
within ten business days after the seller receives written notification 
from the buyer of the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement and 
receive the refund, 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct 
solicitation sale within three business days at the time of purchase if the 
sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business 
pursuant to the supplier's mail, telephone, or personal contact and if the 
sale price exceeds $25, which notice shall be a conspicuous statement 
written in bold type, m immediate proximity to the space reserved for the 
signature of the buyer, as follows- "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL 
THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE 
THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSAC-
TION ", 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as 
defined under Title 76, Chapter 6a; or 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed m response to a 
charitable solicitation will be donated or used for a particular purpose or 
will be donated to or used by a particular organization, if the representa-
tion is false 
APPENDIX "D" 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (1986) 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an ade-
quate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this 
chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who 
has violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is 
greater, plus court costs. 
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an 
adequate remedy at law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, 
an injunction, and appropriate ancillary relief against an act or practice that 
violates this chapter. 
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may bring a class action for the actual damages caused by an act or 
practice specified as violating this chapter by a rule adopted by the en-
forcing authority under Section [Subsection] 13-11-8(2) before the con-
sumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate 
§ 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a final judgment of the appropriate court or courts 
of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was either 
officially reported or made available for public dissemination under Sec-
tion [Subsection] 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten days before 
the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or with respect to 
a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a 
consent judgment which became final before the consumer transactions 
on which the action is based. 
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a 
supplier and the damages can be computed with reasonable certainty, 
damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with 
due diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to the 
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. 
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a viola-
tion of this chapter resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recov-
ery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in which the 
supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may 
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work 
reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this 
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or 
a supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or 
required by the court to be settled under Section [Subsection] 
13-ll-21(l)(a). 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final 
judgment in favor of the enforcing authority under § 13-11-17 is admissible as 
prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is based in later proceedings 
under this section against the same person or a person in privity with him. 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party 
shall mail a copy to the enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file 
maintained under Section [Subsection] 13-ll-7(l)(e). 
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two years after 
occurrence of a violation of this chapter, or within one year after the termina-
tion of proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect to a violation of 
this chapter, whichever is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, he may 
assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter arisin«r mit nf +fc<* 
